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Ely: Ely: Status of Mental Incompetents

THE STATUS OF MENTAL INCOMPETENTS IN
CIVIL CASES IN MISSOURI
BEN ELY*

I. INTRODUCTION

The term status as used in this article means the inclusion of an
individual in a limited class or group, the members of which, solely because
of their membership, possess certain rights, powers, or immunities, or are
subject to certain liabilities or disabilities which other persons in society
do not possess, or to which they are not subject.1 In systems of laws other
than our own and in the early stages of our legal evolution status groups
were numerous. The consequences of membership therein were of great
importance. Among such status groups may be mentioned slaves and
serfs, nobles, burgesses, and married women. Today the concept of status
has a much more limited legal significance. But several status groups
continue to exist. The one with which we are here concerned is that of
mental incompetents. In many statutes and judicial decisions the 'term
2
insanity is employed as synonymous with mental incompetence. It must

be stressed that mental incompetence is, and by its very nature must be,
a legal term rather than a term of medical science. It is the task of legislatures and courts to define the standards and establish the criteria to be
applied in determining whether or not an individual belongs to this particular status group, and therefore possesses legal relations with the other
members of society which differ from those of persons outside the group.
In establishing such standards and criteria, however, some attempt must be
made to use terms meaningful to psychologists and psychiatrists since these
scientists must be called upon as experts to give testimony ii each case.
The term insanity has lost favor among the mental scientists. The preferred term now is mental illness. This term, however, is not easy to define.
It is a relative term rather than an absolute. Whether we define perfect
mental health as being a condition of perfect adaptation of the individual
*Member of the firm of Ely & Cary, Hannibal, Missouri.
1. See BOUVIER, LAw DicTioNARY, sub verb. Note that this differs from
the definition of status given in the American Law Institute's RESTATEMENT, CONrLICTS OF LAw, § 119 (1934).
2. In the older textbooks and treatises the term lunacy is frequently used,
but fortunately has now fallen into disfavor.
(1)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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to his environment or an ideal perfection of the mental faculties, it is
obvious that no human being ever attains a condition of complete and
perfect mental health. It is equally difficult if we speak in terms of conformity to a standard of normality since this requires a knowledge of
what the completely normal would be. We can pass from this assumed
condition of complete mental health to that of a complete breakdown of
all mental powers and disintegration of the personality by a series of
steps. Between each of these steps the line of differentiation is so hazy
as to defy exact definition. The whole line constitutes a continuum or
spectrum. 8 In each class of cases the law must draw a line, somewhere
along the length of the continuum placing on one side the individuals
who are to be classified as competent and on the other those who are to
be classified as incompetents.
We shall see that this line of demarcation has been drawn differently
in different fields of the law. It will, therefore, be necessary to examine
separately several different classes of cases in which the line of demarcation is drawn. With respect to each class we will have to ask two questions.
First, what standards of "mental competence" has the law established
for this particular group of cases? Second, what legal consequences in
this particular field of the law follow from the inclusion of an individual
in the class of incompetents? The present paper does not directly concern
itself with mental incompetence as a defense for crime. Yet the criminal
law must be referred to occasionally as it has affected the law in civil
cases.4 Nor will we attempt to catalogue and discuss all of the various
fields of the civil law in which the mental competence of the individual
is an important factor. We will select only some of the most important
classes of cases in which this question arises.
II. CASES OTHER THAN

WILL CASES IN

WHICH

THE

PROBATE COURT EXERCISES JURISDICTION

Aside from the question of testamentary competence, the probate
courts are called on to make adjudications in matters involving the mental
condition of a party under two statutes that, although somewhat interrelated, are quite separate and distinct. The first type of cases involves
the involuntary commitment to a hospital, clinic, or mental institution of
3. MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE, 1963, Chs. 5 and 6.
4. See for example Hoedemaker, "Irresistible 1=pdlse" A Defense in
Criminal Law, 23 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1948); Sobeloff, From McNauglhten to Durham and Beyond, 15 MD. L.

REv.

93 (1955).
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mentally ill patients, and is governed by the mental health law found in
sections 202.780 to 202.880, RSMo 1959. The second involves an adjudication of mental incompetence and the consequent appointment of the
guardian of the person or estate or the person and estate of the adjudicated
individual. It is based on Chapter 475 of the Probate Code.
In limini it must be remembered that the probate court, although a
court of record, is one of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction must be
derived solely from the provisions of Section 16 of Article V of the Missouri Constitution of 1945 which reads as far as here pertinent: "[T]here
shall be a probate court in each county with jurisdiction of all matters
pertaining to probate business . . . the appointment of guardians and
curators of minors and persons of unsound mind." This constitutional
provision does not appear to confer on the probate court the power to
commit a mentally ill individual for involuntary hospitalization without
appointing a guardian. The great social importance of that type of procedure makes it probable that the courts will construe it liberally and
will uphold the present statutory provisions on the ground that they are
a mere extension of the guardianship powers expressly conferred on
the probate court.5
A. Involtntary Hospitalization
The mental illness statute (sections 202.780 to 202.880, RSMo 1959)
empowers the probate court to order the commitment of certain mentally
ill persons to public or private hospitals or similar institutions for care,
examination, and treatment without their consent. Several procedures are
provided, but with one exception they are preliminary and emergency
procedures only Each of these emergency procedures envisions a final
determination after a formal hearing in the probate court in which the
rights of the alleged incompetent to due process of law are fully protected.
This formal procedure in the probate court, spoken of as "standard judicial
procedure," is regulated by section 202.807, RSMo 1959, and contains the
criterion we seek. It provides that the order of hospitalization may be
made if the court finds that the proposed patient is (a) mentally ill, (b)

5.In the case of State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 269 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1954),
the Supreme Court held certain provisions of the original mental health act
unconstitutional without passing on the question above suggested. The act was
then amended by the legislature to avoid the objections ruled on in the Filler
case. The case of Williams v. Pyles, 363 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. 1963) pointed out
the difference between commitment to a hospital and adjudication, but did not
discuss the constitutional question here raised.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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in ieed of cust6dy, care or treatment in a mental hospital, and (c) because
of his illness lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to his hospitalization. Before examining this criterion,
We must note the effect which the order of hospitalization has on the legal
status of the person hospitalized.
Under section 202.847, RSMo 1959 it is expressly provided that the
committed individual retains all of his "civil rights" including the right
to mak6 contracts, dispose of his property, vote, etc. But there is a limitation on these rights. Apparently if the head of the hospital determines
that the exercise of these rights would impair the patient's treatment, he
inay impose restrictions on their exercise. Thus the extent of these basic
legal rights is subject to the exercise of a power in someone else, and
is thereby cut down. There is, of course, an all important disability imposed
on the patient. His liberty to move about as he desires and to leave the
hospital if he desires is taken away.6
Now let us examine the operative facts that are required by the
statute to be shown before this restriction of the patient's rights may be
imposed. He must be mentally ill. As we have seen, that conception
in itself is somewhat nebulous and hard to define. Yet it may be no more
difficult for a competent medical practitioner to state that a man is suffering from mental illness than for him to say that he is physically ill. The
next requirement is that the proposed patient's mental illness is of such
a nature that its cure or amelioration requires treatment in a hospital
rather than out-patient treatment. It is the committing court which must
determine whether this fact exists or not. But in the ordinary case, the
court will be guided 'by the medical testimony. Again it should riot be
much more difficult for competent physicians skilled in the field of mental
diease to determine that the patient needs hospital treatment for a mental
illness than for other physicians to determine that a patient needs hospitalization for pneumonia or for a heart condition. The final criterion which
must be met, however, is more difficult. When has the patient's mental
condition sufficiently deteriorated s6 that he lacks capacity to determine
for himself whether or not he needs hospitalization? When a physician
tells a patient who has pneumonia that he needs to be in a hospital, the
final choice must be left to the patient. The patient is presumed to have
sufficient judgment, that is, ability to weigh conflicting considerations and
desires, and sufficient control of his own volition to say that he will or will
6. Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1966).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
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not go into' a hospital. In the present case, however, it must be found
that the patient's mental illness has taken away his judgment faculty or
the exercise of his free will to the extent that his choice to stay away
from the hospital will not be a responsible one. Only then is the power
to make that choice for him vested in the probate court.7
We must reiterate that the order of involuntary hospitalization does
not effect that individual's ownership bf'!property, his right to contract, or
to acquire or to dispose of property, to appoint agents, or even to make a
will.8 Nor does such a judgment of the probate court empower the court
to appoint a guardian either of the persoi or estate of the respondent
in the proceeding.9 The appointment of a guardian, regardless of whether
a hospitalization order has been made or not, requires an entirely different
probate court proceeding which we shall now consider.
B. Adjudication and Guardianship
It has long been recognized that certain individuals possessing mental
defects or suffering from mental illnesses are unable to manage their
ordinary business affairs or to control and manage .their property. For
many centuries the court of chancery exercised jurisdiction to determine
the general competency of "imbeciles and lunatics," and after adjudication
of incompetency to appoint a committee to take over the possession and
management of the lunatic's estate and the custody of his person. 10 Almost
7. In some jurisdiction at least the attention given to the delicate task of
balancing the interest of the patient in his own liberty of movement against
the necessity of involuntary hospitalization is given far too prefunctory consideration. See MENNINGER Op. cit. supra at 311.
8. However it has been intimated that a judgment under the mental illness
act gives rise to an inference that the condition of mental illness then found to
exist continues in the future unless the evidence shows to the contrary. Murphy
v. Murphy, 358 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1962); Williams v. Pyles, 363 S.W.2d 675 (Mo.
1963). But since the mere fact of mental illness does not in itself disqualify an
individual from making a will, query as to whether the order of hospitalization
in itself could raise any inference as to the individual's incompetence to make a
will.
9. It is the practice of many probate courts in Missouri to combine the
two proceedings in one case. To do so the allegations of the petition and its
prayer should cover both matters. Better practice would be to treat the two
proceedings as separate. In the incompetency proceeding a jury trial must be
had if either party requests it. This is not true in the hospitalization proceeding
at least in the probate court trial.
10. By statute of 17 Edward II, the Crown was made the guardian of
imbeciles and lunatics. The king exercised this portion of his prerogative through
the Lord Chancellor. Proceedings were instituted in which a jury was summoned
to determine whether the person inquired about was an imbecile or a lunatic.
An imbecile was one who from birth was deprived of his mental faculties.
The test seemed to have been whether he knew such common things as the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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from the beginning in Missouri, this jurisdiction was exercised by the
same court or courts vested with ordinary probate jurisdiction.:" The
jurisdiction of the probate court is now exclusive. It is granted to that
court by the constitutional provision above quoted. It is implemented
by a statute contained in Chapter 475 of the Probate Code. That chapter
governs the appointment of guardians of incompetents and of minors. It
contains a series of specific provisions under which the court, after hearing
with all safeguards required by due process, may enter a decree declaring
the respondent to be "incompetent" after which a guardian is to be appointed by the court. 12 The duties and powers of this guardian, who acts
under the supervision of the court, are carefully set out and defined. It is
beyond the scope of the present article to discuss those duties and powers
in detail. Here again we are concerned with the criteria for a determination of incompetency under the statute and the diminution in the status
of the individual resulting from the adjudication.
The constitutional provision from which the probate court derives
its power speaks of the appointment of guardians for persons "of unsound
mind." This is merely an English translation of the Latin phrase non
compus mentis which went back at least to the time of Sir Edward Coke.
The same language was used in the Missouri Constitution of 1875.13 The
names of his parents, the date, and the place where he was found. We would now
speak of him as one who lacked orientation as to person, time, or place. A
lunatic was one who by reason of disease had lost these faculties. See I BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

301.

11. The history of probate jurisdiction in Missouri is set forth in detail
in LIMBAUGH, MISSOURI PRA TIcE 570 (1935). Mo. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1820)
vested judicial power "in a supreme court, in a chancellor, in circuit courts and
in such inferior tribunals as the general assembly may, from time to time, ordain and
establish." By § 10 the court of chancery was given jurisdiction in all matters
of equity and a general control over executors, administrators, and guardians of
minors. While no specific reference was made to guardians of incompetents,
this must have been included in the general equity powers since this jurisdiction
had been exercised for many centuries by the court of chancery. One year later
the Constitution was amended to abolish the court of chancery and to vest
its jurisdiction in the supreme and circuit courts. Section 12 gave the legislature power to establish inferior tribunals in each county to have probate
jurisdiction. Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1865) created the supreme, district, and
circuit courts and gave the legislature power to create inferior courts. The
Constitution of 1875 first created probate courts on a constitutional basis,
giving them jurisdiction over the appointment of guardians. During the period
before 1875 probate jurisdiction was generally vested in the county courts,
although in certain counties special probate courts were provided. By a series
of statutes beginning in 1835 (Section 44 of the chapter in regard to "insane
persons" and Section 15 of the chapter on courts) the county courts were given'
power to appoint guardians of "insane persons" and to control the conduct of
such guardian.
12. § 475.075, RSMo 1959.
13. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 34 (1875).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
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earlier statutes required that the person adjudicated should be "of
unsound mind and incapable of managing his affairs. '14 Section 475.030,
RSMo 1959 provides that letters of guardianship may be issued "for any
person adjudged incompetent." In section 475.075, RSMo 1959 and the
subsequent sections regulating procedure on hearing, again the term used
is "incompetent." For a statutory definition of that term as used in Chapter
475, however, reference must be had to section 457.010, RSMo 1959. "An
incompetent is any person who is incapable by reason of insanity, mental
illness, imbecility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive use of
drugs, or other incapacity, of either managing his property or caring for
himself or both." Note that this statutory definition does not employ the
constitutional phrase "unsound mind." However, the incapacity of the individual to care for his person or property must arise from "insanity,
mental illness, imbecility, idiocy, senility, habitual drunkenness, excessive
use of drugs, or other incapacity." In view of the constitutional requirement, it must be assumed that the above enumerated conditions amount
to "unsoundness of mind." There is another particular in which this definition departs from the requirements of previous statutes. Under those
statutes it was required that the court find that the respondent, in addition
to being of unsound mind, was incapable of managing his affairs.'r The
present definition requires only that by reason of his mental illness he
be incapable of either managing his property or caring for himself or
both. In the ordinary case in which the individual is capable of managing
his property but incapable of caring for himself the proceeding would be
instituted under the mental illness law. Therefore we ordinarily would be
dealing in these adjudication proceedings with a person who was mentally
ill and therefore incapable of managing his property. While the language
is somewhat different, the meaning is probably about the same as that
used in the former act "incapable of managing his affairs." Thus the definitions of this phrase found in the older cases are probably still applicable.
The courts have frequently said that mere defect of memory as to recent
events or mere eccentric behavior is insufficient to warrant adjudication
and appointment of a guardian. 16 In the case of In Re Delany"7 the St.
14. See, for example, the following definition from § 458.010, RSMo 1949:
"For the purpose of this article, wherever the words 'person of unsound mind'
or 'insane person' occur therein, said words shall be construed to meaan either
an idiot, or a lunatic, or a person of unsound mind and incapable of managing
his own affairs, as the case may be, upon proof as aforesaid."
15. Burke v. McClure, 211 Mo. App. 446, 245 S.W. 62 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).

16. See cases collected in annotation 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1967).
17. 226 S.W.2d 366 (St. L. Mo. App. 1950).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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Louis Court of Appeals said that the proper standard to be applied was:
To say that one is of unsound mind in a legal sense imports not
merely a weakness of understanding, but a total deprivation of
it; and there is no basis for an adjudication that one is of unsound
mind and incapable of managing his affairs unless it is shown that
his powers of reasoning and comprehension have been so far destroyed or reduced by mental weakness resulting from one cause or
another that he is incapable of knowing and appreciating the nature
and consequence of his acts in respect to his own conduct and the
management of his property.
Again in In Re Bearden's the Springfield Court of Appeals used the following language: "[T]here may exist impairment of the mind, confusion,
and lack of clear understanding of reason, yet if there exists sufficient
reason and clearness of mind for an understanding of the nature of his
act or acts, in the ordinary transactions of life, . . . the jury might find
him of sound mind and capable of managing his own affairs." The essential principal to be deduced from these quoted definitions is this: If the
individual is "capable" of understanding and appreciating what he is doing
in transacting his business affairs, he is not incapable of managing his
property within the meaning of the statute. Yet certain words of caution
are necessary. It has been said that mere defect of memory does not itself
create incompetency. Yet some ability to remember essential facts at least
for a short time must enter into the mental processes of an individual
engaging in business. If his business involves the sale of real or personal
property for example, he must be capable of remembering something about
what the property costs or what similar property sells for on the market.
Also the capability of an individual to manage his affairs is somewhat
relative to the type of affairs he has to manage. If the person involved
is in control of large financial operations and his day to day living depends
thereon, certainly a larger degree of judgment and memory is necessary
than would be required of a day laborer who has very little property of
his own, receives only small wages, and is required to perform only routine
tasks.
Consider the manner in which these applications of the proper standard
are to be raised in court. The initial inquest is conducted by the probate
court and may be tried without a jury unless one is demanded by a party.
Usually the proceeding ends there. It may, however, be appealed to the
18. 86 S.W.2d 585 (Spr. Mo. App. 1935).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
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circuit court where in the absence of a jury request it will be tried to the
judge sitting as a chancellor. Perhaps in a majority of cases there is no
jury trial, but in a substantial minority there is. Where the case is tried
without a jury, perhaps no detailed statement of the standard is necessary.
The judge of the court involved is simply confronted with the rather
usual problem of balancing conflicting interests. He must weigh the normal
desire of every human being to manage his own affairs against the necessity
of protecting him against grossly improvident conauct occasioned by his
mental weakness. He must consider the magnitude of the danger to the
person under inquiry himself, to the other members of his family, and
to society in general which may be involved if he is allowed to remain in
charge of his own affairs. And he must weigh against this the undesirability of taking a paternal attitude and in unduly restricting individual liberty
merely because the tribunal believes that someone else could do a better
job than the man is able to do for himself. The admonitions contained
in the cases against considering mere lapses of memory, eccentric behavior,
or intelligence below the common average as establishing unsoundness of
mind are sound and should always be kept in mind. Perhaps no further
or more detailed analysis of the standard can be or should be attempted.
Where the case is tried to a jury, some instruction as to the law is
necessary. This cannot be done in the probate court but must be done in
the circuit court through instructions. Missouri Approved Jury Instructions
has not provided an appropriate form. Perhaps an instruction in the language suggested in the Bearden case would be adequate. Some cautionary
instructions may be necessary because of the common propensity of juries
to believe that they are more capable of managing other people's business
than are the parties directly concerned. Yet even here there is danger in
going beyond the very language of the statutory definition.
C. Legal Consequences of Adjudication
Chapter 475, RSMo 1959 provides for the appointment of a guardian
of the person as well as the guardian of the estate, and such guardian of
the person is given custody over the incompetent.' 9 He cannot cause the
involuntary hospitalization of the incompetent without resorting to the
procedures provided under the mental illness law as discussed above. The
19. Section 475.120, RSMo 1959. This section was adopted prior to the

present version of the mental illness act. As far as it permits the compulsory
institutionalization of the ward it may have been superseded by the later act.
C.F. § 475.355, RSMo 1959.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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principal effect of the adjudication will, therefore, be upon the property
rights and other so called civil rights of the incompetent. Title to the incompetent's property remains in him, but the guardian is vested with the
right of possession and management. 20 He is to receive and account for all
income from such property whether it be rent, interest, dividends, or profits.
He may, with the consent of the court and after a proper showing, sell the
property or lease it or mortgage it.21 The incompetent no longer has the
power to enter into valid contracts. 22 There is some question as to his
power to make a will. He cannot appoint an agent. He cannot institute a
lawsuit in his own behalf except through his guardian. If he be sued the
guardian would defend the action. He is without power to vote. If at the
time of adjudication he holds public arffice, he is automatically removed
therefrom. 8 Thus his status as a free individual is drastically diminished.
III. CONMRACTS

While a deed or other instrument of gift or transfer of real or personal
property is actually something different from a contract, 24 the two classifications may be considered together. The first distinction which must be
noted is that between a contract made by a person who has been adjudicated incompetent under Chapter 475, RSMo 1959 and one made by a
person who, while he has not been so adjudicated, is actually mentally
25
infirm at the time he performed his jural act.
As has been noted, the Probate Code makes the contract, deed, or transfer made by an adjudicated incompetent absolutely void unless consented to
by the guardian and the court. We, therefore, turn to the second class. It
is said that the contract of one who is actually incompetent although not
adjudicated is voidable rather than void.26 Thus if a contract is executory
only, it may be enforced by the incompetent against his mentally normal
opposite number. But there are exceptions even to the avoidability of the
20. § 475.130, RSMo 1959.
21. §§ 475.175, .220, .230, RSMo 1959.
22. § 475.345, RSMo 1959.
23. § 475.350, RSMo 1959.
24. An instrument of conveyance either of real or personal property is
usually based upon a contract or itself embodies some of the terms of the
contract. Yet it is the operative fact which destroys the complex of jural relationships constituting ownership of the transferor and creates a similar complex
in the transferee.
25. Compare 29 Am. Jur., Insane Persons, § 66 with 29 Am. Jur., Insane Persons, § 67.
26. Rubenstein v. Dr. Pepper Co., 228 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1955) (Decided
under Missouri law).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
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contract. If the mentally normal individual does not know of the mental
incompetence of the one with whom he is dealing, the latter cannot avoid
the contract without restoring the status quo. If the consideration has
been actually given by the normal person, it must be restored by the
incompetent who has not yet performed his side of the bargain, but
seeks to avoid responsibility therefor.27 Of course, if the incompetent has
transferred property to a normal individual who in turn has transferred to
a bona fide purchaser for value, no restitution from the latter may be
had. 28 There is a further exception. This is when a normal individual has
furnished the necessities of life to a non-adjudicated incompetent. Here
the normal party may recover by way of restitution from the incompetent
the reasonable value of the necessities so furnished. 29
We turn now to the standard of incompetency to be applied in
these contract cases. A further sub-classification has been adopted by the
courts. The standard differs in those cases where the two parties deal at
arm's length from that applied where the transaction is in essence a gift
by the incompetent to the normal individual.30
A. Arm's Length. Contracts
What is the standard of mental incompetence to be applied where
an alleged incompetent has entered into an arm's length business contract
with a mentally normal person which the incompetent seeks later to
avoid? The formula given by the Missouri courts seems to be rather uniform. In Messer v. Helfer 1 the court laid down the rules as follows:
"Mere peculiarities or eccentricities of the grantor do not make a deed
invalid, if he had sufficient capacity to understand the nature and
effect of the transaction" 82 However, this does not tell the whole story.
27. See Rubenstein v. Dr. Pepper, supra note 26.

28. Note, 32 COL. L. REv. 504 (1932).
29. This is possibly true even where the necessities have been supplied
to one who has been adjudicated. See Tock v. Tock, 120 S.W.2d 169 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1938).
30. Schneider v. Johnson, 351 Mo. 245, 207 S.W.2d 461 (1948); Edinger v.
Kratzer, 175 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1943); Farr v. Lineberger, 207 SW.2d 455 (Mo.

1948).

31. 278 Mo. 416, 212 S.W. 896 (1919).
32. Cf. Brann v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W. 48 (Mo. 1920);
Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359, 95 S.W. 227 (1903) (actually involving a gift
transaction but treated by the court as an arm's length transaction); Cutler v.
Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92 (1893); Masterson et al v. Sheahan, 186 S.W. 524 (Mo.
1916). (It is not clear whether the court treated this as a gift or a business
transaction. The case involved a delusional complex which, however, did not
affect the action of the grantor in this instance.) See also Brucken, Mental Illness and Contracts, 57 MiuH. L. Ray. 1021 (1959).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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It may be possible that the mentally ill individual, while having sufficient
memory and judgment to understand that the instrument he signed is a
contract or a deed, may not have sufficient powers of reasoning to appreciate the value of the consideration he is getting or of the right with
which he is parting. Suppose the case of a weak minded individual-not
merely a foolish one-who parts with a building worth a hundred thousand
dollars for five thousand dollars simply because he is mentally incapable of
knowing the respective value of the building and the consideration. Perhaps in most of those cases the decision would rest on the ground of fraud
or undue influence 38 rather than mental incompetence. This is because of
the reluctance of the courts to set aside a contract for inadequacy of consideration. If the contracting party was by reason of mental disease,
incapable of knowing the value of the thing with which he is parting and
that which he is getting for it, a court of equity should not hesitate to
decree avoidance of the contract on restoration of the status quo.
B. Gift Transactio-ns
With regard to the gift transaction, the courts have frequently said
that the rule to be applied is the same that would be adopted in a will
case.8 4 This is in some respects looser and in some respects more stringent
than the rule above stated in regard to arm's length contracts. The analogy
of the gift contract and the will is a close one. In each case the testator
or grantor receives no consideration and therefore his capacity to bargain
is immaterial. In each case his gift or devise disposes of property which
would otherwise have gone on his death to his heirs by intestate succession.
It would seem quite proper therefore to apply the same standard of mental
capacity to the two transactions.
IV. WILLS

No person has an inherent and natural right to devise or bequeath
his property. Such a right is given by statute only, and in the State of
Missouri the statute creating the testamentary power is section 474.310,
RSMo 1959. That section gives testamentary power to all persons "of sound
mind" over the age of eighteen. Previous statutes85 made distinctions between
men and women and between the devise of real estate and bequest of
33. Bushman v. Bushman, 279 S.W. 122 (Mo. 1925).
34. Cases cited in note 30 supra.
35. See § 468.130 and § 468.140, RSMo 1949.
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personal property, but all of them used the same phrase "of sound mind."
Neither the present statute nor its predecessors attempt to define the
term.
A general definition of testamentary capacity which is pretty well
accepted in all Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions is set out as follows:
A testator, at the time of executing his will, must have sufficient
mental capacity to know the natural objects of his bounty, to
comprehend the kind and character of his property, to understand
the nature and effect of his act, and to make a disposition of his
property according to some plan formed in his mind.
Soundness of mind means ability of the testator mentally to
understand in a general way the nature and extent of his property,
his relation to those who naturally have a claim to benefit from the
property left by him and a general understanding of the practical
effect of the will as executedasa
Some Missouri cases say that in addition to the requirements stated
above, the testator must have sufficient mental capability to "understand
the ordinary affairs of life." 36 If this proposition be sound, it would mean
that in the first instance we must apply to the testator the same criterion
of mental soundness that is applied in the guardianship cases. The proposition could be put in more logical terms by stating that no person who
is incapable of conducting the affairs of life is capable of making a will.
But if that were true, it would also follow that no person is capable of
making a will who is incapable of entering into an arm's length contract.
But the courts have frequently said that a lesser degree of mental ability
is required for the making of a will than for the making of a business contract.3 7 Hence, it follows that the statements contained in these decisions

do not represent the law of Missouri. The sole criteria of testamentary
capacity in this state are those set out in the basic definition quoted at the
beginning of this section. 38 Perhaps we should make an exception even to
that rule because, as will appear from our subsequent discussion of delusions,
courts require that the testator shall be exercising his own free will in
performing the testamentary act.
35a. 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 81.
36. Ahmann v. Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. 1948); Benoist v. Murrin,
58 Mo.307 (1874).
37. Crossan v. Crossan, 169 Mo. 631, 70 S.W. 136 (1902), Crowson v. Crowson,
172 Mo. 691, 72 S.W. 1065 (1903).
38. Winn v. Grier, 217 Mo. 420, 117 S.W. 48 (1909); Gibony v. Foster,

230 Mo. 106, 130 S.W. 314 (1910).
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In further examining the basic definition,' we.must have in mind, the
purpose to be accomplished by the requirement of testamentary mental
competence. Here again we are balancing interests. While the members
of a decedent's family have no natural right to inherit his property,39 at
least in the case of near kin such a desire is normal. To a certain extent
this interest is recognized and taken into consideration by the law. But
there is a countervailing interest of the owner of property in his ability
to control its devolution after his death. He may have a strong feeling that
his statutory heirs at law should not receive his property but that some
other person or institution should get it. The ability to accomplish that
result may be of great emotional importance to him. Since the adoption
of the earliest statute of wills, the law has considered that the interest of
the decedent in his ability to control the devolution of his property outweighs the desire of his kin to inherit. The only exception is for the special
rights which have always been accorded his surviving spouse, and are now
accorded to his unmarried minor children. But this recognition of the controlling importance of decedent's power to devise his property can be given
effect only where his choice is free, and is based on an understanding of
the meaning of the testamentary act.
A testator can understand what he is doing in making a will only if
he knows what property he is devising. Hence, the requirement that he
must have mental ability to know the general nature and extent of his
estate. Certainly this does not mean that he must know every item of
property which he possesses. If that were the requirement, only persons of
very limited means could qualify. Also very few testators are capable of
determining with any degree of exactness the true value of each item of
property. All that is required is that the testator be mentally capable of
forming a general idea of the kind of property he possesses, and of forming
a fairly reasonable conception of its value. If he has such general knowledge
of his estate, he must also be capable of knowing at the time he signs his
will that it designates the persons who, on his death, will receive his estate
or the part thereof mentioned in the will.
He is also required to have enough mind to know the "objects of his
bounty." He must be able to know who the persons are to whom he is
39. Even that arch-conservative,. Sir William Blackstone, in the 18th Century expressed this principle in the following language: "Accurately and strictly
speaking, there is no foundation in nature or in natural law . . . why the son
should have a right to exclude his fellow creatures from a determinate spot of
ground, because his father had done so before him." II BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Ch. 1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
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leaving his property and who the persons are who would get the property
if he did not make a will. This does not mean that he has to understand
the statute of descents. He must simply know that he is taking the property
from the members of his family or some of them and giving it to someone
else. Note that there is no requirement that the testator actually knows
either the nature of his estate or the objects of his bounty. He must simply
be mentally capable of knowing these things. Conscious memory consists
in the ability to call into present actual consciousness things which have
been perceived in the past. Until the act of volition is performed they are
stored in the preconscious or foreconscious part of the mind. Where these
previous experiences of perception have been repressed because of some
internal conflict, the act of voluntarily bringing them into consciousness
is at least temporarily completely inhibited. Furthermore certain purely
anatomical conditions of the nervous system can prevent the active recall
of things known in the past. These inhibitory conditions whether anatomical
or psychological make memory in the ordinary sense impossible. If the
testator cannot remember either the nature and extent of his property or
the identity of the objects of his bounty or the persons who will be deprived
of that property by the making of that will, his testamentary act is not
intelligently performed and cannot be validated by the law.
We have stated above that the testator must act voluntarily. The
testamentary act must be the product of his own free choice. For many
centuries theologians, philosophers, and psychologists have debated the
question of determinism versus free will. Many thinkers, either on philosophical or scientific grounds, have insisted that the idea of free choice
is a mere illusion. The alleged scientific grounds on which determinism
was supposed to rest have recently been subjected to considerable criticism and doubt. Many equally capable thinkers in all fields have always
adopted the indeterminate philosophy. The law has always accepted the
proposition that mentally normal individuals are possessed of free will.
If that fundamental assumption be denied, our whole law of contracts and
much of our law of torts would have to be abandoned or rewritten. Therefore, in this field of testamentary capacity we are entitled to assume that
mentally normal individuals are capable of exercising a free choice. We -are
justified in requiring that the testamentary act be an exercise of such power
of free choice.
If the complete freedom of the testator's will is interferred with by the
idue influence of someone "else, the will is not his own and will have no
legal effect. A discussion of when influence is undue lies outside the scope
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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of this article. But we note that some testators who have the general
mental capacity to kfiow their estate and the objects of their bounty are
so mentally weak as to be abnormally susceptible to suggestion. Here the
mental condition of the testator, although not disqualifying him per se
from the making of a will, may be and often is a factor to be considered
in determining whether or not the testamentary act was produced by undue
influence.
A special group of cases has considered the effect on testamentary
capacity of delusions or of a delusional complex. 40 Psychology and psychiatry
have long recognized the existence of delusions as a symptom of mental
illness. Many of the decisions use the expression monomania or partial
insanity as equivalent to the term delusion or delusional complex. Those
terms are not in accordance with modern scientific thought. The following
scientific definition of a delusion has been given: "A delusion may be
defined as a fixed false belief out of which an individual cannot be argued
by appealing to his reason or judgment."41 This is not very different from
the definitions found in the Missouri decisions. But this is not to say
that the presence of delusions constitutes a peculiar type or class of insanity.
Rather the delusions are a symptom or syndrome appearing at certain
stages in the decay or disintegration of the human mind. Always they are
caused by underlying internal conflicts which bring about an imbalance
or disassociation of the personality. It is to be noted that the group of
false beliefs forming the delusional complex must be differentiated from a
mere mistake or mistaken idea. A testator may believe, for example, that
a child who purports to be his son is not really his son in the biological
sense at all. Shakespeare put into the mouth of Prospero in answer to
his daughter's question, "Art thou indeed my father?" the words, "Thy
40. Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307 (1874); McGrail v. Rhoades, 323 S.W.2d
815 (Mo. 1959); McGrail v. Schmitt, 357 S.W.2d 111 (Mo. 1962); see Annot., 9
AL.R.3d 1 (1967).
41. 3 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 5 (1958) (Article by Frank J. Curran,
M.D.). Compare HART, THE PSYcHOLOGY OF INSANrrY (1929). Closely
nected with delusions are hallucinations which are defined as follows in 3
YERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 5 (1958): "A hallucination may be described
false sensory perception involving any of the five senses. In this condition
is no actual external stimulus. For example, a person may say that he
voices talking to him when no one is around to talk to him, and there

con-

LAW-

as a

there
hears
is no

radio program in the vicinity." The true delusion as distinguished from a mere
mistaken idea is a part of the disassociation of the personality brought about
by a conflict between the id and the super ego causing a repression of unwanted
memories and ideas. Cf. Menninger op. cit. supra at 226; Southard, On the
Application of Grammatical Categories to tie Analysis of Delusions, 25 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 424-455 (1916).
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mother did protest as much." The difference between a mere mistaken
belief and a delusion is that the latter is the result of disorder and disintegration of the mind. Its objective distinguishing characteristics are the
complete lack of any logical foundation, and that the person holding the
delusional belief cannot by any logical process be persuaded to abandon it.
But here we are in serious danger. It often happens that one man may hold
a belief which seems completely illogical to others but which may turn out
to be true. The history of science is replete with illustrations. Aristarchus,
Copernicus, and Bruno in asserting that the earth revolved around the sun
rather than the sun around the earth ran counter to the accepted belief
of everyone else at the time. The latter lost his life for adhering to that
belief. Our measure of normality can hardly be conformity to generally
accepted opinion. Hence the courts properly have been very hesitant to
brand a fixed belief as a delusion. This reluctance has been particularly
strong where the belief lay within the field of religion and spiritual matters.
Yet delusions do actually exist. The patient who insists that he is really
Napoleon Bonaparte or that she is Queen Elizabeth I obviously is evidencing a syndrome of mental illness. One characteristic which is often present
is a complete failure of connection between the ideas contained in the
delusional complex and the other behavior of the individual. The patient who
insists that she is Queen Elizabeth makes no objection when she is set the
task of scrubbing the ward floor. One who says he is really John D. Rockefeller does not hesitate to bum a cigarette from an intern. The psychiatrist
who has a full opportunity to examine the alleged mentally ill individual
can often determine that splitting or dissassociation of the personality
really exists, and that it has produced the delusional complex. When we
are dealing with the validity of a will, the testator is dead and cannot be
psychoanalyzed. Yet even here the courts, approaching the matter with
the greatest care and discretion, may often determine that the testator
when he made his will was suffering from a delusion. This does not end
the matter. The delusion must have caused the testator to make the particular testamentary provisions that he did make.42 Granted that a testator is suffering from a delusion when he believes that he can communicate with his deceased mother. That fact standing alone would not invalidate his will. It must appear, for example, that he thought that his mother
had told him to disinherit his sister, and that he acted upon that belief.
Suppose the testator believed that John was not really his son, but was
42. Cases cited supra note 40.
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the son of an illicit relationship of his wife with another man. If this
has caused him to disinherit John the delusion, if delusion it were, would
be sufficent to invalidate the will.
V. THE

DEFENSE OF SUICIDE IN ACCIDENTAL DEAT

INSURANCE

Many policies of insurance provide for the payment of a death benefit
where the death of the assured has been caused, independently of any
disease, solely by external, violent, and accidental means. Under Missouri
statutes the insurer in an ordinary life policy may not avoid payment
because the assured's death was the result of suicide. 43 Yet it is held that
under ordinary circumstances death by suicide is not produced by "external,
violent and accidental means." Therefore, under a purely accidental death
policy or the double indemnity feature of an ordinary life policy, the
beneficiary may not recover if the assured committed suicide.44 However,
when the suicide was committed by an "insane" assured, and was caused
by the assured's mental illness, recovery may be had even under an accident
policy or for double indemnity.45 What is the criterion of insanity to be
applied in these cases? Unfortunately the courts in these cases have been
influenced by the rules of the criminal law defining responsibility for a
commission of a crime. In denying recovery to the beneficiary we are not
punishing the suicide. Yet the cases seem to have laid down a dual test.
The first test is the now somewhat discredited McNaghten rule. 46 Did the
assured at the time of committing suicide know the difference between right
and wrong, and know that his act of suicide was morally wrong? This rule
places on the psychologist or psychiatrist or other medical practitioner
the undue and often impossible burden of determining what is right and
what is wrong. It is true that in our society, as distinguished from some
other societies notably that of the Japanese, suicide is generally considered
wrong. But are there circumstances which would cause us to modify that
moral judgment? Should the expert witness or the juror or the judge apply
his own ethical code in passing on the matter? In any event what has the
moral culpability vel non of the assured's act of self destruction to do with
the liability of the insurer?
The other test, applied in the alternative, is the irresistible impulse
rule. While this test used in criminal cases has been subjected to some
43.
44.
45.
46.

§ 376.620, RSMo 1959.
Aufrichtig v. Columbian National Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W. 912 (Mo. 1923).
Aufrichtig v. Columbian National Life Ins. Co., s~pra note 44.
McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200 (House of Lords 1843).
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criticism, partly unjust, it does have great validity. There are cases in
which a mentally deranged individual does have an uncontrollable desire
to do a particular act, and does act under the compulsion of that desire.
Certainly if suicide is produced by such an irresistible impulse, it is not
intentional and therefore is accidental within the meaning of the law. We
must carefully distinguish between the act of self destruction caused by an
uncontrollable impulse which is itself the product of mental illness and
disintegration, and one which is caused by a carefully reasoned conclusion
that death is under the circumstances preferrable to life. It is suggested
that the true test is whether the suicide was brought about by a condition
of mental disintegration or mental illness which undermined and destroyed
the judgment, reasoning ability, or free will of the suicide. 4t7

VI.

DIVORCE

Rightly or wrongly our system of divorce is based on the conception
of fault. Divorce is granted to an innocent and injured spouse when the
other spouse has committed any one of a series of acts which are deemed to
be wrongs. 48 Thus the moral element is necessarily present in each case.
Occasionally these wrongful acts of the party are ones for which, because
of his mental condition, he is not morally responsible. It is natural and
reasonable that the courts adopt in these cases a criterion of responsibility
very similar to, if not identical with, that applied in criminal cases. Even
before the enactment of our present statute on criminal responsibility, the
courts here had laid down the alternative tests of knowledge of right and
wrong and irresistible impulse. 49 The present statute which lays down the
test of criminal responsibility adopts a combination of the McNaghten doctrine and the irresistible impulse doctrine in the alternative. 50 It thus
reaches the identical result achieved by the courts in the divorce cases.
In the divorce cases the courts are not bound by this statute, and might
well have adopted the Durham rule. 51 If they do this, the sole question
47. The following Missouri cases have announced the dual rule stated
above in the text. Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Company of America,
168 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. 1942); Rogers v. Travelers' Inc. So., 278 S.W. 368 (Mo.
1925); Lemmon v. Continental Casualty Co., 169 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. 1943). Of
course, if the insured was incapable because of his mental illness of realizing
that his act would result in death, his death would be accidental even though
he were not suffering from a compulsive desire to do the act.
48. The grounds are given in § 452.010, RSMo 1959.
49 Willis v. Willis, 274 S.W.2d 621 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955).
50. § 552.030, RSMo (1967 supp.).
51. Durham. v. United 'States, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
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will be whether the adverse party in the divorce case has committed the
acts complained of as a result of a condition of mental illness. Perhaps
this is going too far. It would enable a party in a divorce case to prevent
the granting of a decree if his or her conduct was merely neurotic or the
result of a mind in the very first or preliminary state of mental disintegration.
This result might not be socially desirable. Perhaps the existing rule is
the best practical solution of the problem.
VII. PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION

Where a person has been adjudicated under Chapter 475 of the
Probate Code, he may not in his own name commence an action as plaintiff in any court. The suit must be commenced by his guardian in his name.
Suits against him must be defended by his guardian. 52 If in spite of this
statute the adjudicated incompetent was sued directly, and the guardian
did not appear, and a judgment was rendered, it would be void and subject
to collateral attack. This is fair because the adjudication of incompetency is
made by a court of record, and its judgment is open to the public, and
the guardian is required to publish notice of his appointment. Thus the
prospective plaintiff together with all the world is placed on notice of the
existence of the guardianship.
What of suits by or against a person who is actually incompetent, but
not adjudicated as such? The established rule is that a judgment rendered
in favor of such individual cannot be attacked either directly or collaterally
on the ground of incompetence by the adverse party. On the other hand,
if the judgment be rendered against the incompetent person, it cannot
be collaterally attacked on the ground of his incompetence. But unless he
was represented in the proceeding by a guardian ad litem, 53 it is subject
to direct attack. If the fact of incompetence appears on the record (either
the record proper in the old sense or the trial record which used to be
called the bill of exceptions) the attack may be by appeal taken within
the time and in the manner prescribed in the Mo. R. Civ. Pro. But if the
fact of incompetence does not so appear or no appeal was taken as prescribed in the rules, direct attack may be made by a proceeding before
the trial court in the nature of a petition for writ of error coram nobis.
The standard of mental competence to be applied in these matters is quite
clear. Was the defendant mentally ill; was his mental illness of such a
52. § 475.130, RSMo 1959.
53. Gibson v. Pollock, 166 S.W. 874 (K.C. Mo. App. 1914).
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degree as to prevent or interfere with his intelligent conduct of or participation in his defense? 54 The same standard is applied in a criminal case in
which the defendant seeks a stay of proceedings or of execution on the
55
ground that he was incompetent to conduct his defense.
On occasion a mentally ill individual may be called to the stand
as a witness in a case between two other parties. He will be deemed to
be a competent witness if he is capable of understanding the sanction of
his oath, and has no gross impairment of his powers of observation, memory,
and narration that would probably interfere with his correct account of
the things concerning which he has testified.56 It is exceedingly important
that the trier of the fact have before it all obtainable data bearing on the
issues of the case. Sometimes this will require the acceptance of testimony
from a witness who is somewhat mentally ill. It should be left to the
discretion of the trial judge, subject to a measure of review in the appellate
court, whether the witness should be rejected outright. The exercise of
that discretion would depend on the extent of the witness' derangement
weighed against the importance of receiving his testimony. But if the evidence is received, it should also be possible, subject to discretion of the
court based on the complication of issues and the undue prolongation of
the trial, for the opponent to bring forward evidence of the mental condition of the witness to affect his credibility.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We lawyers, whether we are on the bench, at the bar, in the law
schools, or in the legislature, are not experts in the fields of psychology
or psychiatry. We are not trained to make the fine distinctions which
our professional brethren trained in those disciplines make between different types of mental conditions nor to evaluate the sometimes conflicting
theories of mental disease which they have proposed. Yet we are confronted
with a practical task. Obviously some individuals in society, because of
mental deficiency or illness, must be treated by the law in a manner different from that used with "normal" individuals. Some must be, for their
own protection, confined temporarily at least in hospitals or institutions
for mental treatment even though they resist such confining. Others must
be deprived of the management and control of their estate. The contracts
54. Gibson v. Pollock, supra note 53.
55. Polsky, Present Insanity-From the Common Law to the Mental Health
Act and Back, 2 VILL. L. REv. 504 (1956).
56. Watts, PsychiatricChallenge of Witnesses, 9 VAND. L. REv. 860 (1956).
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and wills made by some must be treated as legally inoperative. Somewhere
we must draw a line that will separate persons deemed in law to possess
all the powers and capacities of the average normal man from those upon
whom these disabilities are imposed. The drawing of that line must be
accomplished by lawyers since many of the considerations involved require
expertise peculiar to our discipline rather than to that of mental science.
We must be ready to learn from the psychologist and psychiatrist, but
we may not evade our responsibility in drawing these lines of demarcation.
The task is a pragmatic one. The lines must be drawn, and the standards
set, in such a manner that they can be applied in the ordinary course of
legal proceedings by judges and jurors who are medical laymen. The terms
to be used must be understandable to judges and jurors. Yet they must not
be wholly incomprehensible and meaningless to the expert witness.
In this article we have attempted to show that the lines have been
drawn differently in different fields of the law. That is not a criticism of
the law. Our ultimate purpose in each classification is to achieve justice.
In each classification we are engaged in social engineering, to use a favorite
phrase of Dean Pound. We are balancing conflicting interests. That balance will be achieved by differing definitions, depending upon the fact
situation with which we are dealing. The definitions taken from the statutes
and decisions in the different fields have been compared. Sometimes we
find they are quite similar. At other times rather different. But this is
inevitable. For the most part courts and legislatures have arrived at definitions which are as practically workable as any which could be formulated
in the present state of our knowledge.
A quarter of a century ago, Professor Green in an article in this
Review 51 criticized the courts for a lack of uniformity in their definition
of mental incompetence. Some of his criticisms were justified. Much additional careful analysis is needed. His article was based on the then highly
popular psychological theory of behaviorism. The behavioristic school of
psychology, starting with the famous experiment of Pavlov and worked
out in detail by Watson and Max Meyer, seems to have lost some of its
popularity. While it achieved certain valuable results, the attempt made
to extend their method to other social sciences and particularly to jurisprudence was not always practical. They started with the proposition that
since mental and emotional states were subjective only and could not be
verified by other observers, they lay outside the scope of the scientific
57. Green, Judicial Tests of Mental I.,ompetency, 6 Mo. L. REv. 141 (1941).
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method. Therefore scientists, they believed, should confine themselves to
objectively observable phenomena. But e*en while these theories were
being developed other psychologists such as James, Bergson, and Freud,
were applying scientific methods to the study of mental states quite successfully. Professor Green criticizes courts and lawyers for the use of such
purely subjective terms as mind, will, reason, judgment, and memory. The
attempt to substitute for those terms purely behavioristic ones seems to
lead to increasing confusion. It is simpler, and just as accurate, to talk
about a man thinking as to talk about a series of nervous reflex actions
leading to contractions of the diaphragm and vocal chords producing inaudible sounds. At any rate neither Professor Green nor any of those
who followed him have so far come up with a set of definitions practically
workable in court based on purely behavioristic descriptions of objective
phenomena. It is believed that judges who are deciding cases on appeal or
instructing lay jurors as to the properly applicable rules of law in these cases
will still be forced to use the old introspective terms. They will still talk
about mind and memory, capacity to reason and to make judgments, and
the freedom to exercise-the will. The results reached by our present methods
have not been perfect from either a theoretical or pragmatic point of view.
But no better standards seem available, and, on the whole, the present
ones work very well.
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